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The Movement Toward Statute-Based
Conspiracy Law in the United Kingdom
and the United States
ABSTRACT

A single criminal charge of conspiracy, because it simultaneously involves an inchoate as well as a substantive offense, is characterized by a
duality that for years has created confusion and uncertainty as to the
proper prosecution and punishmentfor the crime. The author of this
Note places responsibility for this confusion primarily on the judges
whose rulings have produced a highly incoherent body of common law
and secondarily on the complacent legislatures that have allowed judicial interpretationto shape conspiracy law in a haphazard manner.
The Note compares the approaches to conspiracy law taken by the
United Kingdom and the United States. After discussing the historical
origins of conspiracy law and analyzing its various justifications, this
Note then describes recent statutory efforts to reform conspiracy
law-efforts that have been slow and cumbersome. Next, this Note addresses the most controversialissues surroundingthe currentprosecution
and punishment schemes, includingaccessorialliability, the merger rule,

and cumulative sentencing. Finally, this Note predicts the likely direction
of conspiracy law reform. The author concludes that in order for conspiracy law to survive as a useful component of the United States criminal justice system, Congress must follow the lead of its British counterpart by abrogatingthe inchoate common law and codiffing conspiracy
law in the most coherent and explicit manner possible.
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INTRODUCTION

Conspiracy law occupies a unique position in criminal law. Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, preceding the commission of a target crime or
crimes. In addition, conspiracy itself constitutes a crime separate from
the underlying offense: an agreement plus the intention to carry it forth.
Because of its hybrid character, conspiracy law lacks the clarity of many
other criminal law doctrines. The duality of conspiracy law also creates
uncertainty in the prosecution and punishment of a conspiracy and any
substantive offenses associated with it.' What is clear is that conspiracy
law allows for the prosecution and conviction of individuals who might
otherwise remain outside the criminal justice system.2
1. See

GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 420 (2d ed. 1983)

("Conspiracy, the most complex of the inchoate offenses at common law, may seem
somewhat arbitrary.").
2. See Development in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 922
(1959) [hereinafter Developments]. Some critics argue that conspiracy law allows individuals to become legally associated with a crime without a determination of individual
guilt. These critics suggest that other legal doctrines may accomplish the policy goals of
conspiracy without the potential of guilt by association. See Phillip E. Johnson, The
Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1973). But see Paul
Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back From an Ever Expanding,
Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 5 (1992) (discussing the
changes in conspiracy law since the Johnson article).
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Two other factors contribute to the uncertainty of conspiracy law.
First, because conspiracies involve groups, each member of a conspiracy
adds another potential defendant and additional counts to the indictment,
thereby increasing the length and complexity of a trial. Second, conspiracy law is a product of courts rather than of legislatures. While civil-law
states generally have codified narrowly tailored conspiracy statutes, common-law states generally have codified broad statutes and relied on
courts for their interpretation.3 In the past, many judges and prosecutors
relied upon the wide latitude of the conspiracy charge to carry out their
political agendas. 4 More recently, courts and legislatures have recognized
the potential abuses of conspiracy law.5 Reform has been slow and difficult, and certain procedural advantages for the prosecutor, such as liberal joinder of defendants and offenses and the co-conspirator hearsay
exception, remain firmly entrenched in conspiracy law.6
Although subject to frequent criticism, conspiracy law remains an important part of criminal law in common-law states. Over the past century, the United Kingdom and the United States have been at the forefront of the development of conspiracy law. Because conspiracy law in

3. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978). Common-law states rely more on conspiracy law than do civil-law states, the latter employing
other legal devices to achieve the same goals. Id. at 647; see Krulewitch v. United States,
336 U.S. 440, 450 n.15 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Court opinions are frequently
the source of philosophical discussions of conspiracy as judges attempt simultaneously to
justify and criticize the doctrine. See, e.g., Regina v. Withers, 1975 App. Cas. 842 (appeal taken from Eng.); Regina v. Griffiths, I Q.B. 589 (Crim. App. 1966); Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
4. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 25-49 and accompanying text.
6. This Note will not focus on the prosecutorial advantages of conspiracy because
these are more a consequence of, and not a justification for, conspiracy law. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 389 (1985). For a discussion of the procedural advantages of
conspiracy law, see WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AusTIN W. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 536-40
(2d ed. 1986).
7. Other common-law nations including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand generally rely on British conspiracy law and frequently refer to cases adjudicated in the
United States. See generally L. J. Jackson, Case Law, Redirecting the Common Law:
The Queen v. Darby, 10 SYDNEY L. REV. 430 (1984) (Austl.); Gerald Orchard, The
Mental Element of Conspiracy, 2 CANTERBURY L. REV. 353 (1985) (N.Z.); Harvey
Groberman, The Multiple ConspiraciesProblem in Canada, 40 U. TORONTO FAc. L.
REV. 1 (1982) (Can.); Wes Wilson, The Political Use of Criminal Conspiracy, 42 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 60 (1984) (Can.).
This Note is limited to a comparison between the laws of the United Kingdom and the
United States at the national level, where conspiracy charges are more likely. See Elliot
L. Weinreb, Note, The Threat of Unfairness in Conspiracy Prosecutions:A Proposal

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

l-VoL 25.951

the United Kingdom and the United States is largely a product of judges,
not legislators, case outcomes often hinge on specific facts rather than on
legal precedent.8 As a result, the development of British and United
States conspiracy law has lacked coherence. This Note will examine the
similarities and differences between conspiracy law in the United King-

dom and the United States to illuminate an area of the law that exists
not in spite of its ambiguities, but because of them.
Part II discusses the early development of conspiracy law, its elements,
and recent efforts at statutory reform. Part III sets forth the various justifications for conspiracy law and how they interrelate. Part IV analyzes
the current charging and punishment scheme as it relates to the law's
justifications. Finally, Part V projects a scenario for the future development of conspiracy law.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Common-Law Developments

Perhaps contrary to popular opinion, the law of conspiracy has existed
for hundreds of years.' The early common law of conspiracy, however,
applied only to conspiracies to obstruct justice 0 and usually involved
false accusations."" Furthermore, a state could prosecute a conspiracy
only if the falsely accused was indicted, and then acquitted of the sub2
stantive charge.'
The first revolution in conspiracy law came about in the early sevenfor ProceduralReform, 2 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.

CHANGE 1, 1 (1972). Some states
within the United States have more restrictive conspiracy laws than those found at the
federal level, but the specifics of state conspiracy laws are beyond the scope of this Note.
For a discussion of various state conspiracy statutes, see Peter Buscemi, Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1122 (1975).
8. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 3.
9. In Regina v. Parnell, 14 Cox 508, 516 (Q.B.D. 1881), Judge Fitzgerald stated
that "[t]his law of conspiracy is not an invention of modem times. It is part of our
common law; it has existed from time immemorial." For a short historical review, see
Regina v. Kamara, 1974 App. Cas. 104, 121 (appeal taken from Eng.). For a more

extensive review of the history of conspiracy law, see J. W. CECIL TURNER, RUSSELL ON
CRIME 1469-94 (12th ed. 1964), Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L.
REV. 393 (1922), and PERCY H.
ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE

WINFIELD, THE HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND

(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1982) (1921).

10. Early criminal procedure left many opportunities for abuse of the judicial system.
For examples of this abuse, see Sayre, supra note 9, at 394-96.
11. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 6, at 525. See generally, Developments,
supra note 2; WINFIELD, supra note 9.
12. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 6, at 525.
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teenth century in Poulterers' Case.13 The Court of Star Chamber held
in Poulterers' Case that a conspiracy need not be wholly successful to
obtain a conviction because the agreement that the conspirators forged

was separate from the substantive criminal act. 14 That is, the crime of
conspiracy lay in the unlawful agreement itself rather than in its execution." This development signaled the beginning of courts' view of conspiracy as a separate crime punishable even if the planned act was not
completed. Consequently, prosecutions and convictions of the crime of
conspiracy increased significantly."
After Poulterers' Case, the English judiciary made greater expansions
in the law of conspiracy. 1" In 1716, the influential Judge William Hawkins stated that "there can be no doubt, but all confederacies whatsoever,
wrongfully to prejudice a third person, are highly criminal at common
law.""' One hundred years later, a well-respected English judge interpreted Hawkins' statement to mean that an indictment for conspiracy
must "charge a conspiracy to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by
unlawful means."' 9
Judges in England and the United States recognized as early as the
beginning of the nineteenth century that an agreement to commit an unlawful act constituted a conspiracy even when they did not interpret unlawful as criminal.2" Judges used this broad definition of unlawfulness to

13.

77 Eng. Rep. 813 (1611).

14. Id. at 813-14. The defendants had falsely accused an individual of robbery, but

because it was clearly evident from the facts that the accused was innocent, the grand
jury did not indict the alleged thief. Id. at 813.
15. Id.
16.

See

17.

See id.

LAFAvE & ScoTT,

supra note 6, at 525.

18. Id. (quoting 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 348 (6th ed. 1787)). This
statement has been the subject of great criticism. See Regina v. Kamara, 1974 App. Cas.

104, 121-22.
19. Lord Denman made this statement in Regina v. Jones, 110 Eng. Rep. 485, 487
(1832). Courts in the United States still quote Lord Denman's statement, although as a
practical matter it is of historical significance only. See Pettibone v. United States, 148
U.S. 197 (1893); United States v. Caplan, 633 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1980). In the United
Kingdom, the scope of the conspiracy definition remained uncertain until the 1970s. See
J.C.

SMITH & BRIAN

HOGAN,

CRIMINAL LAW 256 (1988); Regina v. Withers, 1975

App. Cas. 842 (appeal taken from Eng.).

The most important aspect of "lawful act by unlawful means" has been its use in
statutory conspiracies. For example, antitrust statutes are based on the premise that it is

legal for one merchant to raise the price of goods; however, it is not legal for several
merchants to collude and to raise their prices simultaneously. See, e.g., Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

20. See Developments, supra note 2, at 923.
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impose their view of law and morality in cases that involved questionable
criminal charges, and legislators acquiesced.21 In this way, courts could
achieve what they considered to be just results by serving as quasilegislators.22
Prosecutors also took advantage of the broad nature of conspiracy law
to further their governmental agendas. At the end of the eighteenth cen-

tury, British prosecutors used the conspiracy charge to stifle critics of the
government and to prevent demonstrations calling for religious, social,
and economic reform.2" By the beginning of the twentieth century, the
British and United States governments were using conspiracy charges to
thwart the unionization movement.24
Despite the recognition by British and United States courts that governments could easily abuse conspiracy law, neither nation's courts have
advocated abolishing the crime. 25 United States Supreme Court Justice
Jackson stated in his famous Krulewitch v. United States2" concurrence
that there is a place for conspiracy prosecutions in the United States

21. Id.
22. Sayre, supra note 9, at 408.
23. See Regina v. Greenfield, 1 W.L.R. 1151 (Grim. App. 1973); see also A. H.
Hermann, Conspiracy to Cloud the Issues, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 30, 1988, at 14.
24. See Sayre, supra note 9, at 413-20.
25. Many commentators have criticized the hesitancy of the courts to limit the conspiracy doctrine. In 1922 one commentator warned:
A doctrine so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental nature as
criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it is a veritable quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought. That this uncertain doctrine
should be seized upon, perhaps because of its very vagueness, as one of the principal legal weapons with which lawyers press their attack in labor controversies and
in which judges find an easy and frequent support for their decisions is nothing
short of a misfortune. It would seem, therefore, of transcendent importance that

judges and legal scholars should go to the heart of this matter, and, with eyes
resolutely fixed upon justice, should reach some common and definite understanding of the true nature and precise limits of the elusive law of criminal conspiracy.
Id. at 393-94 (footnote omitted). More recent commentators have been more direct:
"What conspiracy adds to the law is simply confusion, and the confusion is inherent in
the nature of the doctrine." Johnson, supra note 2, at 1139.
Interestingly, some judges have used the ambiguities associated with conspiracy law to
limit its application. See Patrick A. Broderick, Note, Conditional Objectives of Conspiracies, 94 YALE L.J. 895, 902 (1985). Similarly, the United Kingdom has experienced
difficulty in extraditing defendants accused of conspiracy from other states. Furthermore,
the United Kingdom has on occasion refused to comply with other states' extradition
requests on the ground that the conspiracy charge can be abused. Hermann, supra note
23, at 14.
26. 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
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legal system 7 in spite of the fact that they are "elastic, sprawling, 'and
pervasive .... [and a] loose practice" that poses a "serious threat to the
2 a
fairness in our administration of justice."2 In Regina v. Parnell,
British court asserted that conspiracy law was unique within the legal
system; although criminal law in general had a necessary degree of certainty, conspiracy was vague and uncertain.30 However, the uncertainty
of conspiracy prosecutions was nonetheless allowable if the state took
great care in its administration."
The conspiracy charge continues to be a powerful weapon favored by
prosecutors. 2 Because of the change's ambiguities, procedural advantages, and potential for prosecutorial abuse, courts in both nations have
attempted to limit the impact of abusive conspiracy prosecutions.
B.

Attempts at Statutory Reform

British and United States legislatures have attempted, through codification, to eliminate the confusion surrounding conspiracy law.33 In the
1970s, the British set out to define the parameters of conspiracy law.
The creation of a Working Paper, 34 followed by a Law Commission,35
27. Id. at 445-46. Justice Jackson continued: "The modern crime of conspiracy is so
vague that it almost defies definition. Despite certain elementary and essential elements,
it also, chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration from each of the many independent
offense is on which it may be overlaid." Id. at 446-47.
Judge Learned Hand described conspiracy as the "darling of the modern prosecutor's

nursery." Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
28. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 445-46.
29. 14 Cox 508 (Q.B.D. 1881).
30. Id. at 519.
31.

Id.

32. See Weinreb, supra note 7, at 7; Note, The ConspiracyDilemma: Prosecutionof
Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARV. L. REV. 276, 284
(1948) [hereinafter Conspiracy Dilemma]. It may also be a burden for prosecutors for the
same reasons it is a benefit. Conspiracy trials can be long and complicated. If the prosecutor cannot understand the case because of its complexities, then the jury might not be
able to completely understand the case either. Out of confusion, the jury may decide not
to convict. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1140; Marcus, supra note 2, at 38.
33. The legislatures in civil-law states have been far more active in defining, by statute, the bounds of conspiracy. Civil-law states, in general, have taken a much narrower
view of conspiracy. See FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 647; Developments, supra note 2, at
923.

34. Inchoate Offences: Conspiracy Attempt and Indictment, 6 Law Commission
Working Paper No. 50 (June 5, 1973) [hereinafter Working Paper].

35. Criminal Law: Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform, 7 Law Commission Report No. 76 (Mar. 14, 1976) [hereinafter Law Commission Report]. See generally Ian H. Dennis, The Rationale of Criminal Conspiracy, 93 LAW Q. REV. 39

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 25.951

was the result of an attempt to establish uniformity and clarity regarding
conspiracy law. The work of these two bodies culminated in Part I of the
Criminal Law Act of 1977 (the Act).3 6 The House of Lords, the highest
British appellate court, described the law as "a radical amendment of the
law of criminal conspiracy." ' The law was considered radical because it
eliminated most common-law conspiracies and replaced them with a statutory scheme.3 Only a few common-law conspiracies, such as conspiracy
to defraud and conspiracies to corrupt public morals or outrage public
decency, survived codification under the Act. 9
Although the Act may have appeared radical by classifying all conspiracies under four categories, 0 it effected few substantive changes in
the law of conspiracy. 4 Conspiracy now has a statutory basis, but the

(1977).
36. Criminal Law Act of 1977, ch. 45 (Eng.). Only Part I of the Act enacts the
revisions to conspiracy law. All subsequent citations are to Part I of the Act.
37. Regina v. Ayres, 1984 App. Cas. 447, 453-54 (appeal taken from Eng.).
38. Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act of 1977 states:
Subject to the following provisions of this Part of this Act, if a person agrees with
any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which will
necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or offences by one
or more of the parties to the agreement if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or

offences in question.
Section 5(2) of the Criminal Attempts Act of 1981 amended section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act of 1977 to include conspiracies where commission of the substantive offense
is impossible, thereby eliminating the defense of impossibility.
39. Conspiracy to defraud remained a common-law conspiracy because the drafters
were concerned about leaving a gap in the criminal law that the Act would not catch.
This distinction between statutory conspiracies and conspiracies to defraud greatly troubled the courts in the late 1970s and 1980s. See Regina v. Ayres, 1984 App. Cas. 447;
Regina v. Holmes, 2 All E.R. 458 (Crim. Ct. App. 1985); Regina v. Tonner, 1 All E.R.
807 (Crim. Ct. App. 1985); Regina v. Duncalf, 2 All E.R. 1116 (Crim. Ct. App. 1979).
See generally A. T. H. Smith, Conspiracy to Defraud: The Law Commission's Working
Paper No. 104, 10 CRIM. L. REv. 508 (1988).
The Criminal Justice Act of 1987 abolished common-law conspiracy. SMITH & HoGAN, supra note 19, at 258. However, Parliament has yet to fully address the commonlaw conspiracies to corrupt public morals or outrage public decency.
40. The four categories are (1) statutory conspiracies under section 1(1), (2) conspiracies under a statute that provides for a conspiracy offense, (3) all conspiracies to defraud, (4) all conspiracies to corrupt public morals or outrage public decency. See Regina
v. Ayres, 1984 App. Cas. at 454.
41. See SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 19, at 257; J.C. Smith, Conspiracy under the
Criminal Law Act 1977(1), 1977 CRIM. L. REv. 598. It is unclear whether the Act still
allows the possibility of punishment even when the completed act is not a crime. See
SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 19, at 287.
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vague language of section 1(1) and subsequent sections, has left the Parliament with the task of defining the statute's parameters to the courts.
Although the Act fails to provide the degree of certainty characteristic
of other criminal statutes, it does provide some reform, and, perhaps
more significantly, demonstrates Parliament's interest in codifying conspiracy law. Moreover, the Act has served as a basis for other statutes
that fill some of the gaps the Act left open. For example, the Criminal
Attempts Act of 1981 expanded statutory conspiracy to include conspiracies to do the impossible.4 2 Most recently, the Criminal Justice Act of
1987 converted conspiracy to defraud from a common-law offense to a
statutory offense, thereby correcting one of the major shortcomings of the
43
Act.
In the United States, congressional efforts to clarify conspiracy law
through federal statutes generally have been unsuccessful, and Congress
has been content with allowing the courts considerable latitude in the
development of the doctrine.44 Congress enacted the most recent general
conspiracy statute45 in 1948 as part of a revision of Title 18, Crimes and
'Criminal Procedure.4 6 It is a broadly tailored statute that codifies the
punishment but not the elements of the offense.47 One substantive change
is the new requirement that the government prove an overt act in addition to the agreement itself as evidence of the conspiracy. 48 However, this
requirement has not been a significant obstacle to prosecution of
conspiracies.4"
In addition to this general conspiracy statute, certain substantive-of-

42. See supra note 38.
43. See supra note 39.
44. The great majority of conspiracy law in the United States has been developed by
the judiciary. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, § 5.03 cmt. at 386 (1985).

45. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
46. 1948 U.S.C.C.S. 645 (special pamphlet on Title 18).
47. See James Ball, Comment, Criminal Conspiracy: A Balance Between the Protection of Society and the Rights of the Individual, 16 ST. Louis U. L.J. 254, 273 (1971).
Section 371 states, in part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States... in any manner or for any purpose, and
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both.
Statutes that include conspiracy as one of the offenses generally have a separate sentencing provision that may provide for a higher sentence than Section 371.

48. Id. This requirement did not exist at common law. See LAFAVE & SCOrr, supra
note 6, at 547.
49.

See Developments, supra note 2, at 946.
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fense statutes include provisions that criminalize conspiracies to commit
the substantive offense. 50 For analytical purposes, it is immaterial
whether a defendant is charged with violating the general conspiracy
statute or a conspiracy provision in a separate criminal statute."1
A blueprint for revision of the general federal conspiracy law appears
in the Model Penal Code.5 2 The Model Penal Code continues to treat
conspiracy as an offense, 5" but it proposes a statutory scheme whose ultimate goal is to add more certainty and coherence to the law.54 Congress
has not adopted the Model Penal Code into federal law.55
C.

Basic Requirements

As with other crimes, proving a conspiracy requires proof of the actus
reus and the mens rea.58 The actus reus is the agreement itself, and it
forms the basis of the conspiracy. 57 The agreement may be oral, and

surrounding circumstances alone may prove its existence.58 Once the
agreement exists, all other acts are merely acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and do not constitute the conspiracy itself."

50. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 372, 794(c), 894(a), 904 (1988).
51. See Broderick, supra note 25, at 904 n.50.
52. See generally Buscemi, supra note 7.
53. The crime of conspiracy is defined in the MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, §
5.03:
(1) Definition of Conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person
or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its
commission he:
(a) agrees with such person or persons that they or one or more of them will
engage in conduct that constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of
such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.
54. The proposed reforms to conspiracy law are found in several Model Penal Code
provisions. Each provision is discussed infra.
55. Although not adopted at the federal level, several states have adopted significant
portions of the Model Penal Code. See generally Buscemi, supra note 77.
56. The distinction between the actus reus and the mens rea is often hazy in conspiracy, which accounts for some of the confusion. See Sir & HOGAN, supra note 19, at
258; LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 6, at 531, 535.
57. Agreement implies that there must be two or more parties. In general, two parties are necessary, although it may be possible in some circumstances to convict a defendant who conspires with a government agent. See SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 19, at
281-84; LAFAVE & SCoTT, supra note 6, at 560-63.

58. See Regina v. Duffield, 5 Cox 404 (1851); Direct Sales Co. v.United States, 319
U.S. 703 (1943); see also Regina v. Cooper, 32 Crim. App. 102 (1947).

59.

See generally Developments, supra note 2, at 925-33.

1993]

CONSPIRACY LAW

The mens rea is the intent to carry out the agreement, not the intent
to agree.6 0 The mens rea for conspiracy is, at a minimum, the mens rea
required for the substantive offense. 6 ' Furthermore, those who agree
must have a common intention. 2 Intention without the agreement does
not constitute conspiracy.6 3
III.

THE RATIONALE OF CONSPIRACY LAW

Perhaps in response to criticism that the crime of conspiracy is too
uncertain to prosecute and punish, the courts have set forth a series of
interrelated rationales for it. These court-fashioned explanations are
themselves frequently unclear, and even the more coherent ones have encountered vocal critics. Nonetheless, exploring the justifications underlying the conspiracy doctrine helps explain why the crime exists as a punishable offense."'
A.

United Kingdom

1. Early Intervention
The Law Commission stated that "the most important reason for retaining conspiracy as a crime was that it enabled the criminal law to
intervene at an early stage before a contemplated crime had actually
60. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 6, at 535-36. Like the agreement itself, circumstantial evidence may prove intent. Id. at 537-38.
61. Id. at 536. Intent, not mere knowledge, is generally required. See Regina v. Anderson, 3 W.L.R. 268 (H.L. 1985); United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
62. Developments, supra note 2, at 926. The requisite intent for a conspiracy indictment has been a controversial issue in Britain. In Regina v. Anderson, 81 Crim. App.
253 (1985), the defendant was charged and convicted of conspiracy to assist in the escape
of a prisoner. On appeal the defendant argued (1) that he was not agreeing to assist in
the escape but was merely agreeing to provide the necessary equipment, and (2) that the
defendant could not have conspired because he did not believe that escape was possible.
The House of Lords rejected the defendant's arguments and dismissed the appeal.
Lord Bridge of Harwich stated that the court must consider the diversity of roles that coconspirators play and that if full intention of all conspirators was required, then conspiracy law would have no effect. Id. at 258-59. Conspirators become involved for many

reasons and, once they achieve their objectives, they do not care if the ultimate goal of the
conspiracy is reached. Id.
For a criticism of Anderson, see P. W. Ferguson, Intention, Agreement and Statutory
Conspiracy, 102 LAW Q. REv. 26 (1986). For a more recent discussion of the issue, see

David Cowley, Conspiracy-The Mental Element, 54 J. CRim. L. 312 (1990) (reviewing Regina v. Siracusa, 90 Crim. App. 340 (1990)); Rosemary Tobin, Conspiracy and
Intention, 1991 N.Z.L.J. 430-31.
63. See Mulcahy v. Regina, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 306, 317 (1868).
64. See Dennis, supra note 35, at 40.
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been committed ....,""Moreover, the law of conspiracy allows intervention at an earlier stage than does the law of attempt." British attempt law focuses on actions that are "more than merely preparatory.'
British conspiracy law focuses on the agreement. Therefore, an agreement to commit a crime may not constitute a violation of attempt law but
will constitute violation of conspiracy law. The Law Commission refused
to combine all inchoate crimes into one general attempt crime, arguing
that the distinction between conspiracy and other inchoate crimes was
necessary to avoid punishing an individual for conspiracy when the intent existed without the actus reus.6 8
Not surprisingly, the Law Commission placed particular emphasis on
the agreement as the primary factor distinguishing conspiracy from attempt. This may be because the agreement is both the actus reus and a
manifestation of the mens rea.e9 The agreement itself holds great significant because it is a step toward the completion of the crime." ° Moreover,
the thinking has been that there is "something inherently wicked" about
71
the conduct of a group, something that is absent when one acts alone.
2.

Inherent Danger of Group Conduct

Neither the Working Party Paper nor the Law Commission Report
addressed the concern about criminal conduct of groups.7 2 This concern
instead emerges in cases in which the facts lend themselves to a groupdanger rationale for punishment rather than an early-intervention
rationale.
British courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries relied on

65. Law Commission Report, supra note 35, para. 1.5. This statement was taken
from the Working Paper, supra note 34, para. 12.
66. See SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 19, at 286. Early intervention, however, may
be a misnomer because it implies that such intervention may not be justified under attempt law. This issue has been subject to great debate over whether conspiracy should be
treated like other inchoate offenses, that is, as preparation for a substantive offense, or
whether conspiracy itself should be treated as a substantive offense. See generally Working Paper, supra note 34.
67. The Criminal Attempts Act of 1981 at Section 1(1) defines attempt to be: "If,
with the intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act
which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of
attempting to commit the offence." Criminal Attempts Act of 1981, ch. 47 (Eng.). See
generally Ian Dennis, The Criminal Attempts Act 1981, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 5.
68. See Working Paper, supra note 34, para. 3.
69. The Commission was not so explicit. See Dennis, supra note 35, at 41.
70. SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 19, at 286.
71. See id. at 287.
72. See Dennis, supra note 35, at 41.
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commercial law as a basis for the development of modern criminal conspiracy law. In Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.,7a a
shipowner sued an association of shipowners that offered merchants a
discounted price for transporting their goods but did not allow the plaintiff to join the association.7 4 The court noted that there is a "general
proposition that certain kinds of conduct not criminal in any one individual may become criminal if done by combination among several."'7

5

It is,

however, the damage the conspirators cause, not the agreement to cause
harm, "that is the gist of actions on the case for conspiracy. 7 6 Lord
Bowen went on to state that this was not a case of legally sanctionable
group conduct because "the combination of capital for purposes of trade
and competition is a very different thing from such combination of several persons against one, with a view to harm .... "7 In other words,
the conspiracy's purpose must be to harm a particular target; the harm is
not an element of a conspiracy if it is a mere consequence of the group's
actions."8
In Quinn v. Leathem,7 the House of Lords applied the Mogul analysis and affirmed the judgment against the defendant 0 for conspiracy to
commit wrongful interference with contracts between the plaintiff and
his employees and customers.8" The defendant's employment association
had pressured the plaintiff to employ only union members.82 The court
characterized this case as one involving "the outcome of a malicious but
successful conspiracy to harm the plaintiff in his trade."8 3 This court
distinguished the case from Mogul because it involved acts directed at a
8 4

specific individual.

73.

23 Q.B.D. 598 (Crim. App. 1889).

74.

Id.

75. Id. at 616 (opinion of Lord Bowen).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 617.
78. Id. In a concurring opinion, Lord Fry noted that the defendants' actions were
merely an effort to make money and that the plaintiff simply was not a good businessman. Id. at 625-26.
79. 1901 App. Cas. 495 (P.C. appeal taken from Ir.).
80. Only one of the five co-conspirators appealed the judgment. Id. at 496.
81. Id. at 518-19. In this civil action, the plaintiff, Leathem, was a butcher. The
defendant was a member of an association that had an unregistered rule that the associa-

tion would not work with nonunion members. Id. at 517.
82. Id. at 517-18. The association threatened to blacklist plaintiff Leathem. In addition, the controversy between the plaintiff and the association had been bad for the plaintiff's business, causing at least one vendor to refuse to deal with the plaintiff. Id.
83. Id. at 528.
84. Id. at 527. The court warned of the threat of coercion on specific individuals. Id.
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Although Quinn was a civil case and the court required a showing of
actual damage for a judgment against the defendant,85 the court stated
that the role of conspiracy was the same in civil and criminal cases. 86
The court cited the criminal conspiracy case of Mulcahy v. Regina
which held that "[t]he number and the compact give weight and cause to
danger."' 87 The Quinn court added that innocent acts performed alone
"become dangerous and alarming [when performed in a conspiracy], just
as a grain of gunpowder is harmless but a pound may be highly
destructive."""
British courts historically have focused their concern on the potential
harm that groups may cause by virtue of being groups. Although civil
remedies may be sufficient in some circumstances, they argued other
cases require the remedies of a criminal prosecution. In Regina v.
89 the court stated that because the potential for damage inParnell,
creased as the number of defendants increased, the criminal conspiracy
charge was the only effective relief for the victim." The government's
interest, Judge Fitzgerald pointed out, was to combat the "powers of
combination."9 1
Over time, as the conspiracy charge became a popular prosecutorial
choice, courts began to reexamine the doctrine and attack the assumption
that groups are more dangerous than individuals. 2 In Regina v.
Kamara,93 the House of Lords surveyed the history of conspiracy law
and concluded that the focus in the doctrine's development in the seven-

at 528.
85. Id. at 529. Although actual damage is required in a tort action for conspiracy,
there is no damage requirement in a criminal action. See Martin-Norwich Products, Inc.
v. Intercen Limited, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, F.S.P. 513 (1976), available in LEXIS, Nexis, Enggen File.
86. Quinn, 1901 App. Cas. at 529.
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 530.
89. 14 Cox 508 (Q.B.D. 1881). The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to prevent tenants from paying their rents. Id. at 508-09.
90. Id. at 521. Judge Barry provided an example: If one person libels V, then V's
recourse is a civil action. If a group libels V, however, V's civil remedy is inadequate
because the weight of the statements against V is much more difficult to counter. Therefore, V needs to invoke the power of the state. Id.
91. Id. at 514.
92. Many commentators have also been highly critical at this assumption, pointing
out that although a group often may be more dangerous, one determined individual on
occasion may be more dangerous than a group. See Dennis, supra note 35, at 46; SMrrH

& HOGAN, supra note 19, at 257.
93. 1974 App. Cas. 104 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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teenth and eighteenth century was misguided.94 Instead of focusing on
the collaboration of the conspirators, the emphasis should be on the damage the conspiracy caused.9" Thus the court reverted to the civil notion of
conspiracy in order to limit its application in criminal cases.
The following year, the House of Lords further eroded the group conduct theory in Regina v. Withers.9" The court held that conspiracy law
should apply only to a situation involving "intimidation or overbearing
by superior numbers," not in the more general context.97 Lord Glaisdale
criticized the group conduct theory as follows:
But the vagueness of the offence when charged against an individual, to
which he objected, is not altered by its being charged as the subject matter
of an agreement. And although'some conduct which causes or tends to
cause extreme injury to the public may be more heinous and more damaging when committed by numbers, not all such conduct will be so; nor may
some such conduct when committed by numbers be necessarily more heinous and damaging than other such conduct when committed by an
individual.98
Until Withers, conspiracy law had employed a presumption in favor of
the prosecution. Withers shows the courts' new willingness to decide
cases based on their unique facts and resistance to assume that groups
present more of a danger than do individuals operating alone.
3.

Current View

The decision in Withers may explain why the Law Commission stated
that the most important reason for prosecuting conspiracy is early intervention rather than protecting the public from the danger of group criminal conduct. In doing so, however, the Working Party and Law Com94. Id. The court reiterated the position that Judge Hawkins's statement had been
given too much importance. Id.
95. Id. at 123. The court did not require proof of harm, but merely that the potential
for harm exist if the conspirators achieved their goal. The facts of this case lend themselves to the damage approach. The defendants were students who conspired to occupy
the London building of the High Commission of Sierra Leone to voice their grievances.

Id. at 106-07.
96. 1975 App. Cas. 842 (appeal taken from Eng.). As in Kamara, the court reversed
the conviction in Withers. Defendants had been convicted of conspiracy to effect a public
mischief. They worked in an investigation agency and made reports for clients about the
status and financial standing of third parties. The defendants had made several phone
calls to banks and government agencies. Id.
97. Id. at 874. Contrast this statement with the statements made in Mogul. See
supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
98. Withers, 1975 App. Cas. at 870.
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mission have failed to explain adequately why attempt law cannot satisfy
these goals. The Working Party and Law Commission merely asserted
that agreements are clear manifestations of an intent to commit a crime;
this approach removes much of the uncertainty that characterizes attempt law, but does not explain the distinction between a group's attempt and a conspiracy."
The Commission noted that, in addition to early intervention, conspiracy law is a valuable tool for striking at the heart of unlawful activities,
namely, the organizers who direct their agents to commit the substantive
acts. 10 0 Although the Commission admits that it is possible to prosecute
the organizers as accessories to the substantive crime, the Commission

believes that a jury will understand more easily a prosecution for
conspiracy. 10 '
Since the enactment of the first general British conspiracy statute in
1977, British courts have resisted making any statement about the
proper role of conspiracy law in the English legal system. The issues
that have arisen since the Act's passage have been ones of statutory interpretation and have not required the courts to justify the existence of conspiracy law. 102 Today, the courts' justification for conspiracy law is that
there is a conspiracy statute.
The real issue of justifying conspiracy law appears to lie with the
legislature. The question is not whether there should be a conspiracy
law, but whether the law should distinguish the crime of conspiracy
from the crime of attempt. Unwilling to integrate the two, the British
legal system continues to struggle for an adequate justification for keeping them separate.'
B.

United States

1. Early Intervention
The courts in the United States have relied periodically, though infrequently, on early intervention as a rationale for conspiracy law. The
99. For a discussion of the current law of attempt in the United Kingdom, see
& HOGAN, supra note 19, at 287-300.

SMITH

100, Law Commission Report, supra note 35, para. 1.6; see Dennis, supra note 35,
at 42.
101. Law Commission Report, supra note 35, para. 1.6.
102. See, e.g. Regina v. Kamara, 1974 App. Cas. 104.
103. Interestingly, the amendments to statutory conspiracy established in the Criminal Law Act of 1977 are found in the Criminal Attempts Act of 1981. This suggests that
Parliament still believes that there is some connection, elusive as it may seem, between
the law of conspiracy and the law of attempt.
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Supreme Court's explanation for this rationale has not been clear. For
0
example, in United States v. Rabinowich,O'
the Court indicated that
because conspiracies are difficult to detect, there is a need for additional
time to discover the conspiracy.1"" In United States v. Feola,0 8 the
Court, citing only a law review article,1 07 stated that the likelihood that
the agreed upon criminal act will in fact occur is great enough to justify
intervention and prosecution. 08 The Court stated: "Criminal intent has
crystallized, and the likelihood of actual, fulfilled commission warrants
09
preventative action."'
The early-intervention rationale finds some support in the connection
between conspiracy and attempt. The crime of attempt requires an act
that is a "substantial step in the commission of the underlying offense."' 1 0 A conspiracy's agreement may be a substantial step toward
committing a crime. Like conspiracy law, one goal of attempt law is to
prevent crime by apprehending and prosecuting the perpetrators before
they complete the criminal act."' Nonetheless, case law simply does not
support the proposition that early intervention alone is an adequate basis
upon which to justify the law of conspiracy even though that basis may
be enough to justify attempt law.
2.

Group Conduct and Potential Future Harm

United States courts have focused on the group conduct aspect and
agreement to commit a crime. The United States Supreme Court, however, has extended the agreement analysis to implicate broader concerns.
104. 238 U.S. 78 (1915).
105.

Id. at 88.

106. 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
107. The article the court referred to was Developments, supra note 2. The reliance
on material other than prior judicial decisions is not surprising. Courts in the United
Kingdom and the United States have had difficulty grappling with conspiracy; the result
is a case law history that is ambiguous and inconclusive. Whether the courts have agreed
or disagreed with the academic critics of conspiracy, the latter have at the very least
provided the former with a set of issues to discuss in their opinions.
108. Feola, 420 U.S. at 694. The relevant section of the article stated: "When the
defendant has chosen to act in concert with others, rather than to act alone, the point of
justifiable intervention is reached .... The agreement itself, in theory at least, provides a
substantially unambiguous manifestation of intent." Developments, supra note 2, at 924.
109. Feola, 420 U.S. at 694.
110. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, § 5.01. The substantial step demonstrates
a "firmness of purpose." See United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841-43 (8th Cir.
1982); Snell v. United States, 627 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 957
(1980).
111. See LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 6, at 498.
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In United States v. Kissel," 2 Justice Holmes described a conspiracy as
"a partnership in criminal purposes."1 1 3 Although the agreement which
the conspirators made was similar to a contract, Justice Holmes emphasized that a conspiracy whose object was the restraint of trade was "different from and more than" a contract that restrained trade.1 14 The
Court attributed to the conspiracy certain acts which followed the conspirators' agreement and did not regard them as separate from it.,1 5
In United States v. Rabinowich,1 6 the Court explained why group
criminal behavior is particularly heinous: "For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to be committed a breach of
criminal laws is an offense of the gravest character sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime." 1 Even in Justice Jackson's sharp criticism of the law of

conspiracy in Krulewitch v. United States,"'8 he conceded that "the
strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer." 1 9
In a subsequent case, Justice Jackson agreed that it was proper for Congress to use conspiracy law to criminalize acts which would not be criminal if committed by one actor.1 2 °
According to the more recent case of United States v. Feola, conspiracy law "seeks to protect society from the dangers of concerted criminal
activity" 12 and the "threat to social order."1 22 Collective action toward
antisocial ends is more threatening to the community than is individual
action. 123 This is due in part to the fact that a conspiracy can achieve

112. 218 U.S. 601 (1910).
113. Id. at 608. As in Mogul and Quinn, the defendant was charged with conspiring
to eliminate free competition. Id. at 605-06.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 607. Furthermore, a conspiracy, unlike a contract, may not terminate at a
specified time. Id. at 608.

116.

238 U.S. 78 (1915).

117.

Id. at 88.

118. 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
119. Id. at 448-49.
120. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 573 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Justice Jackson provided two examples of proper application of conspiracy law: antitrust
prosecutions and labor disputes. In an antitrust scenario, a single business could raise its
prices; however, a group could not get together and agree to do so. In the area of a labor

disputes one worker could quit a job, although it is criminal for workers *to conspire to
quit together. Id. at 573.
121. Feola, 420 U.S. at 693.
122. Id. at 694.

123, Developments, supra note 2, at 923-24.
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more complex goals than can individual action. 124 Furthermore, the likelihood of success increases while the probability that one or all of the
conspirators will abandon the object of the crime decreases.' 2 5
United States courts have also viewed the potential of future harm
unrelated to the particulars of the agreement as significant enough to
warrant the application of conspiracy law. The Court described the conspiracy in Kissel as a partnership, implying that the conspiracy's goals
were ongoing rather than limited to a single venture.1 2 Later cases developed this concept further. In Rabinowich, for example, the Court expressed concern not only with the group's plotting, but also with the
"educating and preparing [of] the conspirators for further and habitual
criminal practices. 1' 27 The group. serves as a "continuing focal point for
further crimes."' 2 In Callanan v. United States, Justice Frankfurter
stated:
Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end
toward which it has embarked. Combination in crime makes more likely
the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the
group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not
confined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the
enterprise.' 29
The Court's suggestion that conspiracies are dangerous entities with
respect to both present and future crimes may derive from a second rationale for the law of attempt. That is, attempt law not only seeks to
intervene at a point before the perpetrator completes the crime, but also
serves a corrective and rehabilitative function.130 One who attempts and
does not succeed may be more dangerous than one who completes the act
because the former remains a continuing threat.' It is this continuing
threat aspect of group criminal activity that the Court seeks to eliminate
through the use of conspiracy law.
The Model Penal Code accepts the two justifications for conspiracy
law stated above-early intervention and group danger. 32 The Model
124. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
125. See id.; see also Developments, supra note 2, at 924 ("[Tlhe encouragement and
moral support of the group strengthens the perseverance of each member.").
126. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
127. 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1985).
128. See Developments, supra note 2, at 924.
129. 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) (emphasis added); see also Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 (1975).
130. See LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 6, at 499.
131. See id. at 495, 499.
132. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, § 5.03 cmt. at 387.
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Penal Code, however, treats each rationale as a separate proposition that
implicates entirely different concerns. Regarding early intervention, the
Code drafters stated that because conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the
law (1) intervenes at the time the agreement becomes concrete and unambiguous, (2) parallels the use of complicity law, and (3) combats
group fortitude.13 Regarding group danger, the Code rejects in part the
justification that groups pose more danger than does a single individual.
' 34
"The measure of . . . danger is the risk of such a culmination."
Therefore, according to the Model Penal Code, only a conspiracy that

involves a continuing enterprise implicates group danger concerns.13 5
IV.

A.

SENTENCING

The Merger Doctrine

At common law, all conspiracies except conspiracy to commit treason
were punishable as misdemeanors.' 3 6 If the target crime was a felony
and the perpetrators completed it, then the misdemeanor conspiracy
charge would merge into the target crime.13 7 The law required this
merger because of the procedural differences which gave the defendant
certain advantages in a trial for a misdemeanor that were not available
in a felony trial.138 Therefore, the state could convict and punish a co139
conspirator only for the completed felony.

133.

Id. at 388.

134. Id. at 390.
135. Id. at 390-91. See generally Conspiracy Dilemma, supra note 32.
136.

LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 6, at 567.

137.

See Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 5 Mass. 106, 108 (1809).

138. In a misdemeanor trial, the defendant was entitled to counsel and a copy of the
indictment, neither of which was available to a defendant in a felony trial. See Callanan
v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589 (1961).
139. Proof of the felony barred conviction for the conspiracy. LAFAvE & ScoTT,
supra note 6, at 567. However, only when the target crime was a felony was there

merger. If the target crime was a misdemeanor or if a statute specifically made conspiracy a felony, then there was no merger. Id.
One remaining bar to a prosecution for both the conspiracy and the completed offense
is Wharton's Rule. One cannot be charged with conspiracy to do a criminal act when
that act by definition requires two persons. See CHARLES E. TORCIA, 4 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW § 731 (1981). For a discussion of its application, see lannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975).
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B.

United Kingdom

1. Rejection of the Merger Doctrine
Historically, British courts rejected the merger rule as it applied to
conspiracy law. In Regina v. O'Connell,'" Lord Campbell stated:
"Where they have actually done what they intended to do, it may be
more proper to prosecute them for their illegal acts; but, in point of law,
14 1
they remain liable for the offence of entering into the conspiracy.
The conspiracy is separate from the act; the state therefore may prose1 42
cute the defendant even if the defendant did nothing to further it.

Four years later, the Court of Queen's Bench in Regina v. Button"3
reaffirmed the abolition of the merger doctrine. The defendants were
convicted in Button of conspiracy to defraud their employer. 44 The defendants argued on appeal that because there was evidence of the substantive crime, the misdemeanor conspiracy charge allowed no conviction
because it merged with the felony of fraud."' The Queen's Bench rejected the defendants' argument and held that the conviction for misdemeanor conspiracy could be upheld even though there was evidence to
convict on the completed substantive offense. 4" The court dismissed the
defendants' concern that they might be punished twice for the same offense, stating that "the two offences [are] different in the eye of the
law.,,4

Although it may seem more logical to pursue a conviction on the substantive count when there is ample evidence to do so, the prosecutor may
opt to charge a defendant only with conspiracy as occurred in Button.

140. 8 Eng. Rep. 1061 (H.L. 1844).
141.
142.

Id. at 1154.
Id.

143.

11 Q.B. 929 (1848).

144. Id. The defendants had used their employer's vats and dyers for their own
profit. Id.
145. The defendants were not charged with the substantive offense of fraud. Id. at

929.
146.

Id. at 948.

147.

Id. at 947. The court indicated that adopting the defendants' argument could

lead to perverse results through sleight of hand:
The felony may be pretended to extinguish the misdemeanor, and then may be
shewn to be but a false pretense: and entire impunity has sometimes been obtained
by varying the description of the offence according to the prisoner's interests: he
has been liberated on both charges, solely because he was guilty upon both.

Id. at 948. However, the court did note that if the defendants were later convicted for the
substantive offense, then it was "the duty of the Court to apportion the sentence for the
felony with reference to such former conviction." Id.
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British courts have, however, discouraged this prosecutorial tactic. In Regina v. Boulton,"'8 for example, the Court of Queen's Bench reversed
the defendants' convictions and warned against charging conspiracy
when there is evidence of the completed crime. Chief Judge Cockburn
stated:
I am clearly of opinion that where the proof intended to be submitted to a
jury is proof of the actual commission of crime, it is not the proper course
to charge the parties with conspiring to commit it; for that course operates,
it is manifest, unfairly and unjustly against the parties accused; the prosecutors are thus enabled to combine in one indictment a variety of offences'
which, if treated individually, as they ought to be, would exclude the possibility of giving evidence against one defendant to the prejudice of others,
and deprive defendants of the advantage of calling their co-defendants as
witnesses. 14 9
Similarly, the Court of Criminal Appeal in Regina v. West 50 reversed
the defendants' convictions 15 ' and stated that charging for the conspiracy
when there is evidence of the completed act "is not to be encouraged."" 2
The court expressed its concern that the judge and jury would be needlessly confused because the prosecutor had sufficient evidence to pursue a
case on the completed offense.153 More important, the defendants had the
right to know the precise charges against them so they could prepare and
offer reasonable defenses; the vagueness of the conspiracy charge made
that more difficult.' 54 Moreover, the court considered conspiracy a much
more difficult concept to comprehend than a conviction on the completed
15 5
crime.

148. 12 Cox c.c. 87 (1871).
149. Id. at 93. The indictment against the two defendants contained fourteen different counts of conspiracy related to the commission of a "felonious and unnatural crime."
Id. at 88. Two male defendants were charged with cross-dressing because they wore
women's clothing while walking in the street or attending the theater. Id. at 89.
150. 32 Crim. App. 152 (1948).
151. The four defendants were associated with a company dealing with toilet preparation goods and were charged with violating a quota established by the Board of Trade.

Id. at 156.

152, Id. at 163. The court reaffirmed Boulton which was "in danger of being overlooked," Id. at 163-64.

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The position that conspiracy is a difficult concept to grasp has been a com-

mon criticism from the courts, reflecting theii own difficulty with the crime. However,
some have forcefully argued that it is the fact that conspiracies by their very nature
involve groups which makes them difficult to understand, not the additional conspiracy
count. This issue becomes more prominent when there is a charge of both conspiracy and
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Despite early criticism of the practice, section 3(3) of the Criminal
Law Act of 1977, as the British courts have interpreted it, allows the
state to prosecute the conspiracy even when there is evidence of the substantive act.""' Intensified judicial scrutiny has made this practice less
attractive, 5 7 but the prosecutor still may opt for the conspiracy charge
because of its procedural advantages at trial.'5
2.

Sentencing on the Conspiracy Conviction

Once convicted of conspiracy, the defendant could receive any one of a
wide range of possible sentences under common law.159 Because conspiracy was a crime apart from the completed act, its punishment was not in
any way dependent on the punishment for the completed crime. Therefore, the issue arose as to whether a conspirator could receive a longer
sentence for conspiracy than the sentence available for the substantive
offense. British courts have determined that a longer sentence may be
appropriate in two situations: when the conspiracy involves continuing
criminal activity and when the conspiracy involves single crimes that offer "exceptional" circumstances.
In Rex v. Morris,'6" the Court of Criminal Appeal formulated the
first reason for a longer sentence for a conspiracy conviction, that is,
because the agreement involved criminal activity on a large and continuing scale. 1 ' The defendant argued that his four-year prison sentence for
the misdemeanor offense of conspiracy to evade duties of customs was
historically disproportionate." 2 The court denied the defendant's request
for a reduction in sentence, holding that a longer sentence is appropriate
when the conspiracy involves more than one distinct activity.26 3 The
court classified the defendant's activity of importing over 10,000 watches

the completed crime. See infra section (IV)(B)(3).
156. See Glanville Williams, The Added Conspiracy Count, 128 NEw L.J. 24
(1978).
157. Id.
158. See supra note 6.
159. See SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 19, at 285.
160. 1 K.B. 394 (Crim. App. 1951)
161. Id. at 398.
162. Id. at 395. The defendant argued that there was no record of any defendant
receiving more than two years imprisonment for a common-law misdemeanor in the past
one hundred years. The court dismissed this contention on several grounds, including the
fact that in the past a two year sentence was considered severe because of the poor conditions accompanying imprisonment. The court stated that these conditions no longer existed. Id. at 396.
163. Id. at 398.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 25.951

as "wholesale smuggling" that had taken place over many months.,"'
The court regarded conspiracy itself as much more significant than any
individual goal of the conspiracy."1 5
Judicial discretion, the second justification for allowing a longer sentence for conspiracy, appears in Verrier v. Director of Public Prosecutions.166 In Verrier, the House of Lords responded to the one issue left
open in Morris: whether a defendant could receive a longer sentence on
a conspiracy count when the object of the conspiracy was only one substantive offense. The defendant in Verrier had received a seven-year sentence for conspiracy to defraud when the maximum sentence for the
crime of fraud was five years. 1 7 The House of Lords upheld the
lengthier sentence, holding that a judge may have grounds for treating
the conspiracy as "an offence different from and more serious than the
substantive offence." ' 8 The House of Lords placed three limitations on
its holding. First, it would apply only to "exceptional" cases.16 Second,
if the prosecutor charges the substantive offense, the court should disapprove a subsequent charge of conspiracy. 70 Third, the House of Lords
holding distinguished conspiracy law from attempt law, noting that a
longer sentence would not apply to violations of attempt law. 71

164. Id. at 398-99.
165. See also Regina v. Blamires Transport Services, Ltd., I Q.B. 278 (Crim. App.
1964)
166. 2 App. Cas. 195 (1967) (appeal taken from Eng.).
167. Id. at 197. The conspiracy involved life insurance fraud. The appellant, Verrier, and his co-conspirator Anderson, conspired to fake the death of Anderson to collect

on Anderson's life insurance. Anderson himself was sentenced to only two years. Id. at
196.
168.

Id. at 223. The House of Lords relied on R. S.

CONSPIRACIES AND AGREEMENTS 81-82

WRIGHT, LAW OF CRIMINAL

(1873) and quoted the following passage:

There may be cases in which the agreement or concurrence of several persons in
the execution of a criminal design is a proper ground for aggravation of their
punishment beyond what would be proper in the case of a sole defendant. Such
would be cases in which the co-operation of several persons at different places is
likely to facilitate the execution or the concealment of a crime, or in which the
presence of several persons together is intended to increase the means of force or to
create terror, or cases of fraud in which suspicion and ordinary caution are likely
to be disarmed by the increased credibility of a representation made by several
persons.
2 App. Cas. at 223 (1967).
169. Id. at 224. The court provided no definition of "exceptional." Critics charged
that this was a loophole that gave an unfair advantage to the prosecution. See Dennis,
supra note 35, at 60.

170. Id.
171.

Id. The maximum for attempt was the maximum for the substantive offense.
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In its report, the Law Commission expressed its dissatisfaction with
the Morris and Verrier decisions."' 2 In addressing Morris, the Commission argued that the state could punish a large or continuing conspiracy
by convicting conspirators for criminal acts they commit as part of the
conspiracy."" Once convicted for a series of substantive offenses, the conspirator could receive consecutive sentences."' 4 If the defendant is
charged and convicted of conspiracy alone, the maximum sentence for
one count of the substantive offense would be sufficient.' 75
Regarding the Verrier decision, the Commission argued that the sentence for conspiracy should not be longer than the sentence for the substantive offense because, in enacting the penalty for committing the substantive act, Parliament "must be taken to have envisaged the worst
possible case of the actual commission of the offence.""' 6
Parliament agreed with the Law Commission, and the Commission's
recommendation became section 3(3) of the Criminal Law Act of 1977.
Under section 3(3), a person convicted of statutory conspiracy may receive a sentence not exceeding the maximum for the substantive
offense.

3.

1 7

The Double Charge, Cumulative Sentencing, and its Limits

Historically, British appellate courts have not been willing to take the
"no merger doctrine" to its extreme and allow a charge of both conspiracy and the substantive act. Moreover, as the Boulton and West opinions
indicate, the courts are uncomfortable with charging conspiracy at all
when strong evidence of the substantive act exists.'" As early as 1848,
just four years after the O'Connell case first abolished the merger

Once again, the House of Lords made clear that conspiracy and attempt were two different doctrines.

172. Law Commission Report, supra note 35, para. 1.97.
173. Id. para. 1.100.
174. Id.
175. Id. The Law Commission argued that the conspiracy to commit the substantive
act could be no more serious than the act itself; therefore, the state should not punish the
conspiracy any more severely. Id.

176. Id. para. 1.97.
177. Criminal Law Act of 1977, § 3(3). When a defendant is convicted of one conspiracy to do many substantive acts, then the maximum sentence for the conspiracy conviction is set at the maximum for the longest substantive act. Id.

The Criminal Law Act does not address the issue of fines and it remains possible to

receive a large fine for conspiracy, even larger than one would receive for the substantive
offense. See Williams, supra note 156, at 24.
178. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 25.951

rule,17 1 the Queen's Bench stated that conviction on both the conspiracy
and substantive counts did not necessarily amount to consecutive
sentencing.18 0
The courts' reluctance to permit both a conspiracy charge and a
charge for the substantive act lies in part in their concern about confusing judges and juries. In Regina v. Dawson,' the state charged and
convicted six defendants on one count of conspiracy and fourteen counts
of fraud.1 82 The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the convictions and
pointed to several negative effects the conspiracy charge had on the
trial. 8 3 First, the substantive counts were provable, so the conspiracy
charge complicated the trial without adding anything beneficial."' Second, the conspiracy count allowed admission of otherwise inadmissible
evidence.18" Third, the additional conspiracy count added to the length of
the trial and was "a quite intolerable strain both on the court and on the
' 186
jury.'
Nonetheless, the Dawson court did not prohibit double charging. Instead, the court fashioned a new analytical approach to the problem.
Under the traditional approach, the jury looked at the conspiracy charge
first and then at the substantive crime.18 7 The Dawson court's approach
was to evaluate the substantive charge first and then determine the viability of a conspiracy count.' The benefit of this approach, the court
stated, would be that the state could bring many smaller, more manageable conspiracies before the court rather than a single large, complicated
conspiracy.'8 9
Related to the concern about confusing judges and juries is that of the

179. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
180. Regina v. Button, 11 Q.B. 929 (1848).
181. 44 Crim. App. 87 (1960).
182. Id. at 89.
183. Id. at 93. The court also pointed to its previous encounters with conspiracy and
its dangers. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. Recently, the assumption that the conspiracy count actually leads to more
confusion was challenged:
The supposed procedural unfairness cannot lie in any extra complication introduced by the conspiracy count. A charge of joint crime normally implies that the
defendants have acted in concert, so that the addition of a conspiracy count does
not, on its face, increase the issues that the jury have to try.
Williams, supra note 156, at 24.
187. Dawson, 44 Crim. App. at 94.
188.
189.

Id.
Id. at 172.
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unmanageability of a trial involving double charging.19 In Regina v.
Griffiths, the state charged nine defendants with one count of conspiracy
to defraud the government and twenty-four counts of the substantive offense of false pretenses. 9 ' During the trial, 60 witnesses appeared for
the prosecution, 35 witnesses for the defense, and the defense and prosecution offered a total of 263 exhibits. 92 The court held that the prosecution had failed to prove that there was a single comprehensive conspiracy
among all 9 defendants. 9 3 In reversing all of the convictions, the court
stated that there were two types of confusion that the court could not
adequately control. First, there was "general confusion" that led jurors
to complain during the trial "at their having to try the case with all its
details and ramifications."' 94 Second, there was "procedural confusion"
related to the admissibility of evidence; the judge needed to instruct the
jury that it could not consider certain evidence admissible to prove the
conspiracy in determining guilt or innocence on the substantive offense.195 The court expressed its frustration:
The practice of adding what may be called a rolled-up conspiracy charge
to a number of counts of substantive offences has become common. We
express the very strong hope that this practice will now cease and that the
courts will never again have to struggle with this type of case. . .
Despite Dawson and Griffiths, British courts have continued to allow
convictions for both conspiracy and the completed offense. The courts
have allowed a double conviction to stand if the defendant does not directly attack it on appeal. For example, in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot,'1 the defendants were convicted of importing cannabis
into the United Kingdom without a license and conspiracy to import
dangerous drugs.' 98 Defendant Doot received consecutive sentences.' 9 9

190. 1 Q.B. 589 (Crim. App. 1966).
191. Id. at 593-94. The indictment alleged that the defendants had committed fraud
in obtaining subsidies from the government. Id. at 591.

192. Id. at 593. The trial lasted 10 weeks and the jury was required to return 78
verdicts. Id. at 592-93.
193. Id. at 597. The court stated that the evidence pointed to several smaller conspira'cies. Id. at 599.

194. Id. at 594. The confusion associated with the added conspiracy count is generally seen as an advantage to the prosecution. See Dennis, supra note 35, at 58; SMITH &
HOGAN, supra note 19, at 280-81.
195. 1 Q.B. at 594.
196. Id.
197. 1973 App. Gas. 807 (appeal taken from Eng.).
198. Id. at 819.
199. Id. at 820.
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Lord Dilhorne noted that the defendants on appeal did not raise the
issue of sentencing but indicated that the House of Lords probably
would have rejected the argument if it had been raised because the court
accords deference to the trial court's determinations. 0 0 Indeed, Lord
Salmon opined that the sentence that the trial court imposed may have
been too lenient.20 1
The courts' deference to prosecutorial discretion is a means by which
they allow the conspiracy and substantive counts to stand.20 2 The courts
have been unwilling to establish a rule that might unduly constrain the
prosecutor, such as in the situation in which the prosecutor charges both

crimes because of the uncertainty of securing a conspiracy conviction.20 3
Instead, judges have preferred to deal with the problem of double charging on a case-by-case basis.2 '
The Law Commission recognized not only the problems facing those
defendants which Griffiths and Dawson exemplified, but also the procedural needs of prosecutors.20 5 Ultimately, the Law Commission recommended a rule of practice requiring the prosecutor to justify the joinder
of the conspiracy and substantive counts.20' If the prosecutor failed to
justify the joinder adequately, the prosecutor would have to choose to
pursue either the conspiracy count or the substantive count. 0 7 The
Queen's Bench Division adopted the Law Commission's recommendation in 1977 virtually verbatim and issued a Practice Note.20 8 The Prac-

200. See id. at 821.
201. Id. at 831.
202. The reluctance of the courts to infringe on prosecutorial decisions is exemplified
in Regina v. McDonnell, 3 W.L.R. 1138, 1144 (Bristol Assizes 1965), where Judge
Nield stated:
I respectfully agree with [the observations in West and Dawson]; but it is plain, I
think, that the court cannot direct the prosecution as to the course to be adopted..
. On the other hand, of course, sometimes an expression of judicial opinion will

affect the prosecution with the conduct of their case. In this particular case I do
not feel that I ought to express a view.
On this ground, Judge Nield allowed the conspiracy count to remain in the indictment

but later in his anticipatory ruling dismissed the conspiracy count on a different, unrelated ground. Id. at 1149.
203. See Williams, supra note 156, at 24.

204. See, e.g., John McKinsie Jones, 59 Crim. App. 120, 124 (1974).
205.
206.

See Law Commission Report, supra note 35, paras. 1.67, 1.69.
Id.

207.

Id. para. 1.71. The joinder decision therefore was ultimately left to the judge.

Id,
208. 2 All E.R. 540 (1977). The Practice Note reads in part:
1. In any case where an indictment contains substantive counts and a related
conspiracy count, the judge should require the prosecution to justify the joinder,
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tice Note concluded with the statement that "[a] joinder is justified ... if
the judge considers that the interests of justice demands it."
The meaning of the "interests of justice" appears in John McKinsie
Jones,2 9 a case which preceded the Practice Note:
It is not desirable to include a charge of conspiracy which adds nothing to
an effective charge of a substantive offence. But where charges of substantive offences do not adequately represent the overall criminality, it may be
appropriate and right to include a charge of conspiracy.
The indictment ought to include those charges which make for simplification of the issues and which avoid complexity and the need for multiplicity of counts. In some cases a conspiracy count may involve complexity
which counts for substantive offences would avoid; in other cases a charge
of conspiracy may be the simpler way of presenting the case to the jury
because the alternative would be to proceed on a substantial number of
changes of substantive offenses ....

A count for conspiracy should not be

included with counts charging substantive offenses if the inclusion will
result in unfairness to the defence.210
Because it is still possible to charge both conspiracy and the substantive
offense, it is also possible that a jury will convict on both counts. Some
commentators suggest that proper jury instructions from the judge should
prevent this occurrence.21 1
The Practice Note seemingly has reduced the number of prosecutions
for both conspiracy and the substantive offense.2" 2 When there is a
double conviction, the appellate courts are likely to prevent a trial court
from imposing double punishment. In D.P.P.v. Stewart,2 13 for example,
the defendant was indicted for conspiracy under the Customs Act and for
the substantive offense of failing to offer foreign currency to an authorized dealer.2 14 The judge convicted the defendant and sentenced him to
£30,000 or 6 months imprisonment for each offense. 15 On appeal, the

or, failing justification, to elect whether to proceed on the substantive or on the
conspiracy counts.
Id.
209.

59 Crim. App. 120 (1974).

210. Id. at 124.
211. See Williams, supra note 156, at 24-25. The judge should evaluate the evidence
twice before the jury is instructed: 1) at the hearing before trial where the judge will
apply the test set forth in the Practice Note and 2) after hearing and evaluating all the

evidence at trial to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support either count. Id.
212. See id.
213.

3 W.L.R. 884 (P.C. 1982).

214. Id. at 890.
215. Id.
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court reduced the sentence for the conspiracy offense to a nominal fine of
£100 because the two offenses arose out of the same facts and imposing
2 16
substantial penalties for each of them would have been excessive.
4.

Accessorial Liability and the Substantive Offense

The rejection of the merger'rule permitted the possible prosecution of
the substantive crime even if the conspirator played no direct role in its
commission. As a result, prosecutors could charge minor conspirators as
if they actually carried out the target crime. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot sets forth this analysis.2"' In Doot, Lord Pearson analogized the conspirators' agreement to a contract entered into by two or
more parties.2 " Therefore, each conspirator is a party to the agreement
and benefits from each of the acts of the co-conspirators.21 9
However, Doot remains a unique case in British criminal law. 2 Few
British cases impute accessorial liability for a substantive offense through
the conspiracy mechanism. Accessorial liability has remained the province of agency law. 22 ' A conspirator who does not participate directly in
the pursuit of the substantive offense is but a secondary party, not principally liable for the object of the conspiracy. 22
C.

United States

1. Rejection of the Merger Doctrine
Although the British courts abolished the merger doctrine as early as
1844, courts in the United States were more hesitant to formally reject it
until much later. Instead, the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine
until the middle of the twentieth century, yet consistently found it inapplicable to the case before the Court.
For example, in United States v. Britton221 and Clune v. United
States, 224 the Court held that theie was no merger of the conspiracy and
substantive offense because the record contained no evidence that would
216.
217.

Id.
See 1973 App. Gas. 807 (appeal taken from Eng.).

218. See id. at 827.
219. Id. at 830. In a separate opinion, Lord Salmon, conceptualized the conspiracy
as a continuing enterprise. Id. at 835.
220. Later court opinions do not cite Doot for the principle of accessorial liability
being derived from the conspiracy.
221. SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 19, at 132.

222. Id. at 150.
223. 108 U.S. 199 (1883).
224. 159 U.S. 590 (1895).
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conclusively prove the substantive offense. Therefore, in each case, the
conspiracy count stood alone. In Heike v. United States,225 the Court
went one step further and stated that even if there was evidence of the
completed substantive offense, an indictment for conspiracy alone was
permissible because "the liability for conspiracy is not taken away by its
success." 226 The Court's decision in Heike made clear that prosecutors
could charge a conspiracy even when the substantive offense was in fact
completed; it implied, however, that prosecutors could not charge both
the conspiracy and the substantive offense that was the object of the
conspiracy.117
Finally, in Pinkerton v. United States, 228 the Court abolished the

merger doctrine.229 Walter Pinkerton and his brother Daniel were each
charged and convicted of one count of conspiracy as well as several substantive counts of tax fraud.230 Because Walter was the party who carried out the plan, Daniel argued on appeal he could not be held responsible for Walter's substantive acts. 2 ' The Court rejected Daniel's

225. 227 U.S. 131 (1912).
226. Id. at 144. Interestingly, the Court cited Regina v. Button, one of the early
English cases that abolished the merger doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court did not abolish
the merger doctrine in Heike. See also Arnstein v. United States, 246 F. 946 (4th Cir.
1924) (applying the holding in Heike).
227. 227 U.S. at 144. Some lower federal courts were uncomfortable with this position because conspiracies could result in more punishment than the substantive offense.
The Supreme Court's narrow application of the merger rule did not serve as a safeguard
against excessive punishment for a conspiracy. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 103 F.2d
759 (3d Cir. 1939) (intent of statute was that punishment for substantive offense would
be the maximum punishment for conspiracy to commit that offense).
The merger rule formed the basis for Wharton's Rule; one can not be liable for conspiracy to commit an act that requires more than one individual for its commission. With
the subsequent abdication of the merger doctrine, Wharton's Rule has had extremely
limited application. See United States v. Bevite, 648 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1981).
Wharton's Rule basically applies today when the defendant can prove the conspiracy
is limited to the one substantive offense, the agreement of the participants is necessary for
the completion of the substantive offense, and the conspiracy and substantive offense are
inseparable. United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 987 (4th Cir. 1973); see also United
States v. Cerone, 830 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1987).
228. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
229. Even before Pinkerton, the original justification for the merger doctrine was
seemingly gone as the procedural differences in the trial of a misdemeanor and a felony
were no longer substantially different. See LAFAVE & SCOrr, supra note 6, at 567.
230. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641. Walter was convicted of nine substantive counts
and Daniel was convicted of six. Id.
231. Id. at 645. There was evidence of the conspiracy but no evidence that Daniel
had directly committed the offense. Daniel was in jail at the time of some of the substantive acts. Id. at 645, 648.
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argument and upheld the convictions for the conspiracy and substantive
counts on two grounds. First, the Court referred to its language in previous cases stating that a conspiracy "has ingredients, as well as implications, distinct from the completion of the unlawful project." 2 2 Second,
the Court directly addressed the merger doctrine2 33 and stated that as
long as co-conspirators have not withdrawn from the conspiracy, they
are aiding in the carrying out of the substantive offense.234 Moreoever,
the Court emphasized that a conspiracy was similar to a partnership;
therefore, the lower court was correct in extending agency law to conspiracies.235 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated:
Each conspirator instigated the commission of the crime. The unlawful
agreement contemplated precisely what was done. It was formed for the
purpose. The act done was in execution of the enterprise. The rule which
holds responsible one who counsels, procures, or commands another to
236
commit a crime is founded on the same principle.
The Pinkerton Court placed three limitations on its decision. First, it
noted that "[t]he addition of a conspiracy count may at times be abusive
and unjust. ' 2

37

Second, it stated that the substantive act for which a co-

conspirator was to be held liable must be done in furtherance of the
conspiracy and be reasonably foreseeable "as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. ' 23" Third, the Court stated that
defendants could escape liability for the substantive act if they could

232. Id. at 644. Defendant could not raise double jeopardy as a defense to cumulative sentencing. Id.
233. Id. at 643. The Court noted that the merger doctrine had little vitality. Id.
234. Id. at 646. Supporters of the Pinkerton doctrine have argued that an individual
should not be able to escape liability just because he is not the one who pulls the trigger.
See Jon May, Pinkerton v. United States Revisited. A Defense of Accomplice Liability, 8
NOVA L.J. 21, 42 (1983) (a co-conspirator should not be allowed "to hide behind his
associates and escape liability.").
235. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646. One article states:
What was revolutionary in Pinkerton .. .was not the introduction of agency
concepts into the law of criminal conspiracy; agency jargon and agency concepts
had been a routine feature of conspiracy opinions for decades prior to Pinkerton.
What was revolutionary was Pinkerton'suse of agency relationship as a means for
establishing guilt.
James M. Shellow et al., Pinkerton v. United States and Vicarious Criminal Liability,
36 MERCER L, REV. 1079, 1084 (1985) (citations omitted).
236. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647.
237. Id. at 644-45 n.4.
238. Id. at 647-48. This limitation is derivative of the underpinnings of imputed
liability. Shellow, supra note 235, at 1087.
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demonstrate they had withdrawn from the conspiracy." 9
Justice Rutledge wrote a strong dissent that critics of Pinkerton frequently cite.240 According to Justice Rutledge, the majority created constitutional problems in its expansion of conspiracy law, particularly in
the use of evidence in trials2 4' and in the area of double jeopardy.2 42
Furthermore, Justice Rutledge emphasized that the Pinkerton decision
represented an extension of vicarious liability from commercial and tort
law to the area of criminal law.24" This extension was dangerous because criminal law, unlike other areas of the law, places a premium on
individual guilt, not guilt by association.2"4
2.

Sentencing on the Conspiracy Conviction

The Supreme Court in 1895 addressed the issue of imposing a shorter
sentence for the conspiracy than the conspirator would have received for
the substantive crime; that was more than sixty years before the English
courts did so in Verrier.245 In Clune v. United States, 246 the Court held
that a defendant could receive a longer sentence for conspiracy than for
the substantive offense.2 47 The defendants were convicted of conspiracy
to obstruct the United States mails and were sentenced to eighteen
months in jail. 248 The maximum penalty for the completed crime was a
$100 fine.2 49 The Court rejected the defendants' argument that the punishment for conspiracy could not be more severe than the penalty for the
substance offense, stating that because a conspiracy is separate from the
substantive act, it is punishable separately. 250 The Court stated that the
239.

Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646. However, the individual would remain guilty of the

conspiracy. Id. at 647.
240. Id. at 649.
241. Id. at 651. As to Daniel, the evidence only pointed to guilt for the conspiracy
and not to guilt for the substantive crime. Id.
242. Id. at 649-50. See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
243. Id. Some argued that the "importation" of vicarious liability into criminal conspiracy law was "repugnant to the basic precepts of Anglo-American law." Shellow,
supra note 235, at 1080 (citations omitted).
244. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 651. This criticism is generally known as the attack on
guilt by association. See Shellow, supra note 235, at 1085 (describing guilt by association
as the "sinister purpose" behind the Pinkerton decision).
245. 1967 App. Cas. 195 (appeal taken from Eng.).
246. 159 U.S. 590 (1895).

247.
248.
as high
249.

Id. at 595.
Id. at 591. The penalty for the conspiracy under the applicable statute could be
as two years. Id. at 595.
Id. at 594.

250.

It could be punished even if the substantive act was not completed. Id. at 595;
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legislature could prescribe a punishment for conspiracy that it is more
severe than the punishment for the completed offense.2 51
The holding in Clune remains good law, and the sentence for conspiracy is limited only by the five year maximum established in the general

conspiracy statute 5' or the maximum established in a conspiracy provision of a specific criminal statute. In United States v. Cattle King Packing Co.,253 a defendant was convicted on a single count of conspiracy and
six counts of separate substantive crimes associated with the conspiracy.
For conspiracy, the defendant was sentenced to four years imprisonment,
despite the fact that the maximum sentence the defendant could receive
for any of the substantive offenses was three years. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the sentence, citing Clune for the proposition that the congressional intent in 18 U.S.C. § 371 supported the
imposition of a higher sentence.254 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit upheld a five-year sentence for conspiracy relating to
defrauding a savings and loan, although the maximum for any of the
fifteen substantive counts was only two years.255
3.

Cumulative Sentencing

United States v. Pinkerton not only abolished the merger rule in the
United States, it also laid the foundation for debate on two specific issues: first, whether there were any limitations on sentencing a defendant
found guilty of both conspiracy and the substantive act, and second, to
see also United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915). The Clune Court stated
that there was no issue of merger in the case because there was not sufficient evidence on

the record to find actual obstruction of the mails. Clune, 159 U.S. at 595.
251. Clune, 159 U.S. at 595. In the absence of a particular statutory offense and
accompanying punishment, 18 U.S.C. § 371 applies in which the maximum penalty for
conspiracy is a $10,000 fine, five years imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
The Model Penal Code rejected Clune. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, §
5.05(1); see also id. § 5.03 cmt. at 391.
252. The punishment established in 18 U.S.C. § 371 continues to reflect a congressional intent that existed at the time of Clune. The statute specifically states that only
when the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor shall the punishment "not exceed the
maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
253. 793 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1986).
254. Id. at 242.
255. United States v. Smith, 891 F.2d 703, 714 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Congress may
rightly consider conspiracy more dangerous than the substantive offense itself."). The
broad reading of the intent of Congress has been criticized by some courts even as early
as 1925 when Judge Learned Hand stated that the "maximum sentence prescribed by
Congress is intended to cover the whole substantive offense in its extremist degree." Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
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what extent conspirators who play minor roles should be held responsible for the substantive acts of co-conspirators.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue of cumulative sentencing in
Callanan v. United States.2 5 The defendant was convicted of two
crimes-one conspiratorial and one substantive-under the Hobbs AntiRacketeering Act.2 57 The Court, reaffirming Pinkerton, held that the defendant could be sentenced separately for each conviction.2 5 Citing
2"' the Court concluded that cumulative sentencCarter v. McClaughry,
ing did not amount to cumulative punishment.2 6" The Court would allow cumulative sentencing unless Congress expressed a clear intent that
the conspiracy and the substantive offense not both be punished.2" 1 The
Court's justification for separate sentencing stems from its sense that the
danger inherent in conspiracy extends beyond the target crime because262a
conspiracy has the potential to produce additional harm in the future.

In addition, the Court found that cumulative punishment is not double
punishment because Congress has created two separate offenses composed of separate elements.26 3 Although the Court acknowledged that cumulative sentencing may be harsh punishment, it decided to leave that
issue for the legislature to resolve.264
Defendants have also argued that cumulative sentencing violates the

256. 364 U.S. 587 (1961). For an excellent general discussion of multiple punishment as well as a specific analysis of Callanan, see George C. Thomas, A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishment, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1985).
257. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(3) (1988), for conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce
and 18 U.S.C. § 1951(2) (1988) for the substantive act of obstructing interstate
commerce.
258. Callanan, 364 U.S. at 597. The defendants had not argued that they could be
charged with both violations but only argued that they could not be sentenced consecutively for both. Id. at 590.
259. 183 U.S. 365 (1902). In Carter, the Supreme Court upheld the defendant's
conviction for both conspiracy to defraud and the substantive offense of making false and
fraudulent claims. Id. at 394. After stating the rule that "cumulative sentences are not
cumulative punishment," the Court noted that "[t]he fact that both charges related to and
grew out of one transaction made no difference." Id. at 593-94.
260. Callanan, 364 U.S. at 593. In United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693
(1975) the Court stated that conspiracy is separate from and complementary to the substantive offense; therefore, consecutive sentencing was rational.
261. Callanan, 364 U.S. at 594.
262. Id. at 593; see also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-78 (1975).
263. Callanan, 364 U.S. at 597; see also United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358
(9th Cir. 1977) ("evidence showing agreement is quite different from evidence showing
that the plan was carried out").
264. Callanan, 364 U.S. at 597.
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constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 265 In Pereirav. United
States,2 '6 the Supreme Court held that cumulative sentencing does not
raise double jeopardy problems because the legal requirements and evidence necessary to prove conspiracy differ from those needed to prove the
completed substantive act. 26 7 The Court also found no double jeopardy
issue when the government uses overt acts to prove a conspiracy and then
uses those same overt acts as part of its prosecution for the substantive
offense.26 8 Consequently, prosecutions for conspiracy need not even occur
at the same time as prosecutions for the substantive offense. The government, therefore, remains free to prosecute both crimes provided it has
evidence of both.
The Model Penal Code approach would overrule Callanan and not
allow a conviction for both the conspiracy and the substantive act when
the completed offense is the only objective of the conspiracy. 2 9 The rationale is that the state punishes conspiracy because it is an inchoate
offense that will likely result in the commission of a substantive offense.
Therefore, simultaneous punishment of the conspiracy and the underlying offense amounts to punishment of the same action twice.2 70
The Code provides a single exception to its ban on cumulative sentencing-when conspiracies involve continuing enterprises of organized
crime or professional criminals.2 7 ' The Code recognizes this activity as
true group danger,2 72 and these co-conspirators can be sentenced to extended terms of imprisonment.2 73
See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
266. 347 U.S. 1 (1954)
265.

267. Id. at 11. The Supreme Court has also held in Albernaz v. United States, 450
U.S. 333 (1981), that conviction and sentencing on two separate counts of conspiracy is
constitutionally permissible if based on two separate conspiracy statutes.
268. United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1380 (1992).
269. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, § 1.07 cmt. at 110; see also id. §§
1.07(1)(b), 7.06 at 19, 268-70.
270. Id. § 1.07 cmt. at 109.
271. See Buscemi, supra note 7, at 1180.
272. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
273. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6, § 7.03, According to the MPC's "Criteria for Sentence of Extended Term of Imprisonment; Felonies,"
The Court may sentence a person who has been convicted of a felony to an extended term of imprisonment if it finds one or more of the grounds specified in this
Section ....

(2) The defendant is a professional criminal whose commitment for an extended
term is necessary for protection of the public.
The Court shall not make such a finding unless the defendant is twenty-one
years of age and:

(a) the circumstances of the crime show that the defendant has knowingly de-
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4.

Accessorial Liability

The Pinkerton opinion did not consider accessorial liability. Instead, it
viewed conspiracy as a unique area of criminal law and defined co-con-

spirator.Y14 Nevertheless, Pinkerton did form the basis for many subsequent court decisions that significantly expanded the notion of accessorial
liability. It was only three years after Pinkerton that Justice Jackson
wrote his concurring opinion in Krulewitch 7 5 in which he noted his
unease with the Pinkerton decision and his concern that prosecutors may
use conspiratorial liability for the substantive acts of others to incriminate people who were minor participants in the conspiracy; such people
would not be guilty of an accessorial crime such as aiding and
27 6
abetting.
United States v. Alvarez tested the extent to which Pinkerton would
27
apply to conspirators who did not play a major role in a conspiracy. 7
Three defendants challenged their convictions for second degree murder
of an undercover government agent during a drug buy. Although none of
the defendants played a direct role in the shooting, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit deemed them part of the conspiracy to sell
drugs.2"" The government conceded that none of the three defendants
had intended that the agent be shot, but argued that they could be held
liable for the murder under Pinkerton for the substantive act committed
by a fourth co-conspirator. 7 9
The defendants argued that the murder of the agent was not reasonably foreseeable and that they were simply minor players in the conspiracy. 2s0 The court rejected the defendants' arguments and upheld the
murder convictions for two reasons: 28 1 First, it found that the murder

voted himself to criminal activity as a major source of livelihood....
Id.
274. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 647. All participation in the conspiracy made one a
co-conspirator, not an accessory. Id. at 660.
275.

336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949).

276.

Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 450 (1949). It was even possible

under Pinkerton that co-conspirators could be held liable when their actions did not
matter at all. See SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 165 (1987).
277. 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985).
278. Id. at 851. One defendant was a lookout who allegedly was armed. Another had
introduced the agents to Alvarez, the alleged leader of the conspiracy. The third was the
manager of the hotel and was alleged to have allowed drug transactions to take place and
to have acted as a translator during the drug negotiations. Id.
279. Id. at 839-40, 847.
280. Id. at 848.
281. Id.
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was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the drug conspiracy."' The
drug sale involved a large amount of cocaine, 2 3 a fact which enabled the
jury to infer that some conspirators would be armed and would use
deadly force if necessary. 8 Second, the court found that the three defendants played more than a minor role. 285 Their actions were an integral part of the conspiracy. 2 8 The court did limit liability under this
holding, however, to those co-conspirators who played "more than a minor role in the conspiracy, or who had actual knowledge of at least some
of the circumstances and events culminating in the reasonably foresee'2 7
able but originally unintended substantive crime.
Courts have also used Pinkerton to hold organizers of crime liable for
the substantive crimes that they plan but do not personally effectuate. In
United States v. Michel, 288 defendant Belmares challenged his conviction
of the crime of importation of marijuana. 2 9 Belmares argued-that there
was no evidence linking him to the flights that actually imported the
marijuana. 90 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected
Belmares argument, stating:
Well settled is the principle that a party to a continuing conspiracy may
282. Id.
283. The transaction that led to the murder involved the sale of 1 kilogram of cocaine for $49,000. The total value of the drugs discussed in the negotiations was
$147,000. Id.
284. Id. at 849. Weapons were "tools of the [drug] trade." Id.
285. Id. at 850.
286. See supra note 278. The Ninth Circuit has held conspirators liable for the substantive act when the conspirators' activities in the conspiracy were "early, fundamental,
and substantial." United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1977).
287. Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 850 n.27. The court stated that in a typical Pinkerton
case, the court need not inquire into individual culpability; however, this case was not
typical because the murder of the agent was not within the originally intended scope of
the conspiracy. The court was concerned with holding a conspirator responsible for a

substantive act regardless of the individual culpability and the due process implications
involved in the relationship between the conspirator and the substantive act. Id. at 850.
However, not all courts have limited their holdings as the Eleventh Circuit did in Alvarez. Others courts have held that there is a strong presumption of guilt for the substantive acts once a defendant is proven to be a member of the conspiracy. See United States
v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 539 (1st Cir. 1991) (defendants convicted of conspiracy are held liable for the acts of co-conspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy); United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1991) (once government proves
one conspirator committed the act, then other conspirators are also liable).
288. 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1979).
289. Id. at 996. Belmares was also convicted of conspiracy to import. The court
upheld this conviction on other grounds. Id. at 994-96.
290. Id. at 994.

1993]

CONSPIRACY LAW

be responsible for a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator in
furtherance of the conspiracy, even though that party does not participate
in the substantive offense or have any knowledge of it.... It (the princi-

ple of Pinkerton liability) should be no less strictly applied to hold the
organizer or supervisor of a criminal enterprise responsible for the acts of
his co-conspirators done in furtherance of the operation he manages. The
Pinkerton vicarious-liability rationale is based upon an agreement or common purpose shared by co-conspirators; they are partners in crime and the
act of one in furtherance of the unlawful plan is the act of all.29
The Model Penal Code has rejected Pinkerton. Instead of using the
conspiracy to charge the co-conspirator with a substantive act, the Code
favors the use of complicity to hold conspirators liable for their substantive acts. Under section 2.06(a)(ii), a person is deemed an accomplice if,
"with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, he . . . aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in

planning or committing it." Implementation of section 2.06 would force
prosecutors to ask more specific questions about the behavior of each
individual.2 2 The goal of this formulation was to limit the liability of
co-conspirators and to prevent an individual from being held accountable
he was completely una"for thousands of additional offenses of which
293
all."
at
influence
not
did
he
ware and which
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite its important place in the criminal law, conspiracy law remains an elusive subject. Court opinions and statutes have struggled to
clarify the definition, scope, and purpose of the law. As the doctrine becomes more refined, however, it begins to look like other criminal law
doctrines, and the need for a separate conspiracy law disappears. Conspiracy law reform, therefore, is inherently limited.
During the past three decades, British courts have favored the earlyintervention rationale while strongly criticizing the group-conduct rationale. The drafters of the Criminal Law Act of 1977 subsequently
codified the courts' early-intervention rationale. By statute, a conspiracy
cannot be punished more severely than the substantive offense. There is,
however, a court-established presumption against the charging of both
the conspiracy and the substantive offense which was its object. Even if
there is a double charge followed by conviction on both, it is unlikely
291.

Id. at 999.

292.
293.

MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 6,

§ 2.06 cmt. at 307.
Id. See Broderick, supra note 25, at 905 (protecting civil liberties of defendants

by limiting liability to the expectations of individuals).
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that cumulative sentencing will withstand appellate review.
United States courts have favored the group-danger rationale. Unlike
the United Kingdom, the United States has failed to enact a conspiracy
statute with many specifics. Judges in the United States therefore continue to apply conspiracy law based on their perception of the commonlaw approach as it has developed during the past five centuries. The lack
of statutory standards has resulted in the United States courts consistently viewing conspiracy as a separate and more grave offense than the
underlying substantive offense alone because a conspiracy necessarily involves a group of criminals. Conspiracies, therefore, are in many cases
punished more severely than substantive offenses. Finally, courts allow
prosecutors to use conspiracy as a form of accessorial liability for substantive offenses, a device that the British generally reject except in the
most extreme cases.
The use of conspiracy law as accessorial liability highlights how conspiracy law in the United States, when left unchecked by the courts and
legislatures, can expand to encompass more individuals and more offenses based on an incoherent and ever-changing notion of conspiracy.

The recent British approach to conspiracy law has begun the process of
defining the doctrine in a way that does not collapse conspiracy into
other inchoate offenses. Congress should follow the British move and
codify conspiracy law so that the doctrine will survive and serve the
criminal justice system not because of its ambiguities but rather because
of its clarity.
Kenneth A. David*
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